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Willick v. Dist. Ct. (Sanson), 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 19 (Mar. 31, 2022)1
CIVIL: THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT REAFFIRMS THE ADVANCED-STAGE EXCEPTION
Summary
The Petitioners are estopped from filing their notice of voluntary dismissal under NRCP
41(a)(1)(A)(i) because they had waited four years before filing their notice of voluntary dismissal,
and the Respondents had incurred significant litigations costs. The Petitioners had triggered the
advanced-stage exception to NRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by vacating the Petitioners’ notice of voluntary
dismissal.
Background
Willick and Willick Law Group (“the Petitioners”) sued the Respondents, alleging that the
Respondents made defamatory statements against the Petitioners online. The Respondents moved
to dismiss the suit per Nevada’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation)
statute under NRS 41.440.2 In order to dismiss, NRS 41.440 requires a two-step process, requiring
the moving party first to demonstrate that the statements published concerned matters of public
interest and were made in good faith and then second to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on
the claim. The district court denied the motion, finding that the Respondents had not met their
burden on the first step. The Respondents appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, finding that the Respondents had in fact met their burden under step one of the antiSLAPP analyses and directing the district court to consider step two. 3
Upon remand, the parties attempted mediation, which failed. However, before the district
court considered step two, the Petitioners filed a notice to voluntarily dismiss their complaint under
NRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i). NRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i) provides that a Petitioner may dismiss an action
without a court order by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party either files an answer
or a motion for summary judgement. The district court vacated the notice, finding that (1) an antiSLAPP motion was the functional equivalent of a motion for summary judgement under NRCP
41(a)(1)(A)(i), and (2) a plaintiff cannot voluntarily dismiss the case after the proceedings reached
an advanced stage. The Petitioners filed a petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition, asking
the Nevada Supreme Court to vacate the district court’s order.
Discussion
Here, the Nevada Supreme Court first had to determine whether it would consider a writ
of mandamus, as such relief is “an extraordinary remedy that is only available if a petitioner does
not have a ‘plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.’”4 The Court
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determined that the case presented a potentially significant, recurring question of law – whether
an anti-SLAPP motion is equivalent to a summary judgement motion so as to preclude a voluntary
dismissal of a complaint. 5 Accordingly, the Court exercised its discretion in entertaining the
Petitioners’ writ.
The Court first determined that the anti-SLAPP motion was not the functional equivalent
of a motion for summary judgement under NRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Thus, the district court’s first
justification for vacating the Petitioners’ voluntary dismissal was not appropriate.
However, the Court then turned to the district court’s second justification – whether
petitioners were estopped from voluntarily dismissing the case at such an advanced stage. The
Court first acknowledged that it had previously determined that a notice of voluntary dismissal
was ineffective because it was filed at an advanced stage of the proceedings.6 In adopting the latestage exception to NRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i), the Court in Phillip A.C had adopted the Second Circuit’s
rule and reasoning in Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.7 However, the Court
acknowledged that Harvey Aluminum had been subject to controversy and criticism and has been
limited to only “extreme” scenarios where a party is estopped from dismissing a case in order to
avoid an unfavorable decision on the merits after the court has considered the evidence. The Court
recognized the advanced-stage exception as a form of an equitable remedy.
The Court decided to uphold Phillip A.C and found that the Petitioners here were estopped
from voluntarily dismissing their case under NRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The Court found that the
Petitioners had waited a long time – four years – before filing its notice of voluntary dismissal and
the Respondents had incurred significant litigations costs. Accordingly, the Court held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by vacating the Petitioners’ notice of voluntary dismissal.
The Court denied the Petitioners’ petition for a writ of mandamus and prohibition.

Conclusion
The Petitioners are estopped from filing their notice of voluntary dismissal under NRCP
41(a)(1)(A)(i) because they had waited four years before filing their notice of voluntary dismissal
and the Respondents had incurred significant litigations costs. The Petitioners had triggered the
advanced-stage exception to NRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The Court affirmed the district court’s decision.
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